by
Michael Hammerschlag
Moscow
News Jan ‘94
Yeltsin’s moves to consolidate
power directly in his hands seem more and more unwise, because his hands won’t
always be there. After Russia’s
Choice managed, through arrogance and inexperience, to make such a
miserable showing, Yeltsin should have done everything he could to bring all
democrats and reformers together; instead he immediately punished Shakrai Party
members Sergei Stankevich and Legal Dept. Head Kotenkov, and State TV head
Bragin by dismissing them. Admittedly, the Russia’s Choice campaign was
miserably managed: whoever approved that poster of already portly Gaidar
looking positively massive- half turned and leering over his shoulder (“like
a sheep-stealer”, one woman said),
should have been hung out to dry. But ultimately, their failures rest with
Yeltsin, who could have banned competing democratic parties inside the
government and come out strongly for Russia’s Choice (though. the
diaspora of democracy is good in the long and short run, and Yeltsin’s avoiding
partisan endorsements may have been wise).
Zhirinovsky did not, however,
achieve the predominance that people have assumed: the main opposition will
still be communist and neo-communist.
If half of the independents join Russia’s Choice, Yabloko,
and PRES, the reformists will have 177 deputies, if the Communists pick
up 1/3 of the independents along with the Agrarian and Democratic (Travkin)
Parties, they would have 138. Zhirinovsky, forced to choose better people than
himself when confronted with his unexpected success (to moderate his extreme
image), may not be able to hold them: some may defect to the Communists or
Reformers, and few others besides the 65 in his party will probably want to be
publicly allied with such an extreme figure.
If the Communist alliance joins up with Zhirinovsky’s (Zyuganov has had
alarmingly complementary things to say about him), they will be able to block
most reform moves, creating the same stalemate as in the old Congress.
Like Joseph McCarthy, Zhirinovsky
is a textbook demagogue, changing his beliefs as others change suits. When the
Communists were in power, he supported them; when the ‘91 coup-plotters seized
control, he supported them; when Yeltsin was almost impeached by Congress, he
supported them, and incredibly, when Yeltsin shut down the Congress, he supported
Yeltsin, the only reason he wasn’t muzzled along with the other
extremists.
In taking control of newly formed
Press Agencies, Yeltsin is showing alarmingly familiar tendencies and a
somewhat fuzzy understanding of a free press. “There will be a clearer
structure of the mass-media,” he said. “Its subdivisions will be more
independent.... and will report directly to the President.” Independent as
Vyacheslav Bragin?? About new TV
director Yakovlev, he said “We are sure
of him”. Is any leader supposed to be sure of a TV executive?
The reformation and wholesale
housecleaning of the KGB is long overdue, but the way it’s being done, turning
it into Yeltsin’s private police force, is disquieting. 1/5 of the Security
Ministry will be a counterintelligence unit under Golushko, who report directly
to Yeltsin; the other 4/5 (presumably to be mostly decommissioned) will be
under his Kremlin Guard. It’s a classic problem, if the security services are
under the thumb of one man, they can be used to terrorize his enemies; but if
they are independent, they become an unstoppable power in themselves, and can
terrorize everyone (including the highest leaders), which they did here for so
long. The crimes of the KGB are unmatched in human history; even Hitler’s
monstrous minions murdered less than half as many people. By contrast, the
American FBI, with files on everyone in power and a vindictive neurotic at its
head (J. Edgar Hoover), was an independent rogue power for 50 years, cowing
even Presidents.
Yeltsin has correctly ascribed much
of the right wing vote to a protest by the new poor about their economic
devastation, but the incredible military turnout for Zhirinovsky (reportedly
72% in the Strategic Rocket Forces) is a frightening portent of future
problems. Combined with Yeltsin’s debt to the Army for pounding the Parliament
into submission, it means he must address their problems, or else.
The terrible quandary is that
everything Yeltsin does to consolidate power to defend reforms against
conservatives or fascists, make the fascist threat more potent and likely. If
they come to power, all these tools for abuse will be in their hands. “The key
thing Germany did not have (1932) is a President and Constitution standing
guard against fascism”, reassured Yeltsin. But the Constitution grants enormous
power to the President and Yeltsin can only defend the Presidency as long as he
occupies it. If the shredded economy
leads to greater poverty and dislocation in the next 2 years, as is likely,
that may be till 1996.
Michael Hammerschlag is a political
commentator who has spent 2 years in Russia
HOME: http://mikehammer.tripod.com